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Abstract—In this report, we examine Jif, a Java extension
which augments the language with features related to security. Jif
adds support for security labels to Java’s type system such that
the developer can specify confidentiality and integrity policies to
the various variables used in their program. We list the main
features of Jif and discuss the information flow problem that
Jif helps to solve. We see how the information flow problem
occurs in real-world systems by looking at two examples: Civitas,
a ballot/voting system where voters do not necessarily trust
voting agents, and SIF, a web application container implemented
using Jif. Finally, we implement a small program that simulates
information flow in a booking system containing sensitive data
and discuss the usefulness of Jif based on this program.
Index Terms—security, information flow, java, jif, confidential-
ity, integrity
I. INTRODUCTION
Jif is a Java extension which augments the language with
features related to security. Primarily, it helps developers
enforce information flow security constraints at the code level
by using specific Jif annotations and constructs. Jif is available
on http://www.cs.cornell.edu/jif/ and in this report we review
the extension. In this report we aim to,
• give a detailed description of the main features offered
by Jif and the problems that they solve,
• implement a practical example using these features and
• critique the Jif extension with regards to its suitability as
a solution for security related application concerns.
We first give an overview of Jif and its features including
how it augments Java’s type system so that developers can
explicitly state confidentiality and integrity policies for the data
in their programs. We also look at how Jif can be used for two
real-world cases, namely a voting/ballot system and a general
web framework.
We also present a small program implemented using Jif
which will also be used for critiquing Jif towards the end of
the report.
II. RELATED WORK
Jif is one of multiple projects that attempt to solve the
information flow security problem. FlowFox, for example, is
a web browser implemented to take information flow into
consideration and protect the user’s sensitive data [4]. A type
system for a modified version of JavaScript has been proposed
by Hedin and Sabelfeld to introduce information flow security
in web scripts [7]. Both these proposals are relevant because
they encounter the same problems which will be described
later in this report and which apply similarly to Java.
The idea of a security label lattice which is subsequently
used by Jif comes from Denning [5]. Denning proved that
a lattice can be used to verify the information flow security
of a program. Denning & Denning also point out that this
verification can be done statically by a compiler [6] which is
the primary motivation for developing information flow type
systems in languages.
Sabelfeld and Myers discuss information flow security as
it pertains to programming languages in their paper and also
point out the more subtle problems related to language-based
information flow [8]. These include the fact that modern
languages are becoming increasingly more expressive and
more concurrent.
III. BACKGROUND: THE JIF EXTENSION
In this section, we introduce Jif and its main features. All
the information here is from the Jif reference manual available
online [1]. We will focus on the basic features that Jif provides
and how they can be used to solve common security issues
when developing software applications.
A. Information flow
The information flow problem is a common problem in
software development concerning the leaking of sensitive
information to unauthorised people or entities. This typically
occurs not because of a malicious intent by the software devel-
oper but due to bugs and errors introduced in the system during
development stage. A web application might inadvertently
keep sensitive information in memory longer than necessary
which is later leaked out as a response to a user request. This
is clearly a very dangerous issue and tools like Jif are meant
to help tackle and reduce the likelihood of something like this
occurring.
B. Principals, security policies & labels
Jif is concerned about information flow between so-called
principals. Principals are the entities involved with the system.
They can represent a single human user, for example, or
even a whole group of users. Jif defines a relation between
principals called the acts for relation. For instance, if a given
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principal, Alice, can act for another principal, Bob, (written
Alice  Bob) then Bob delegates all of his authority to Alice.
Jif also defines a top principal, >, which acts for all principals
(∀p : Principals · >  p) and a bottom principal, ⊥, which
allows all principals to act for it (∀p : Principals · p  ⊥).
Jif extends the Java type system so that types can be
declared along with a security label. This security label
describes a pair (ie. 2-tuple) made up of a confidentiality
policy and an integrity policy. Each policy is owned by a
principal. A confidentiality policy specifies which principals
the owner allows to read a particular data variable. Likewise,
an integrity policy specifies which principals the owner allows
to modify a piece of data. For example, the confidentiality
policy, Alice→ Bob, means that the data to which this policy
applies is owned by Alice and can be read by Alice herself,
Bob and any other principal that can act for any of them.
Likewise, Charles ← Bob is the integrity policy, owned by
Charles, which allows Charles, Bob and anyone who can act
for them to modify the associated data.
By combining a confidentiality policy together with an
integrity policy, we get a security label of the form {c; d}
where c is a confidentiality policy and d is an integrity policy.
A label is added to a variable declaration to specify the security
policies that govern access to the contained data. So, for
example, we can declare an integer variable which everyone
can read but only Alice can write to as follows,
int{Alice->_; Alice<-*} secret;
C. Method labels
During execution, Jif maintains a program counter which
keeps track of the most restrictive security policy in effect.
If the program attempts to access data with a less restrictive
policy than the one in the program counter, the compiler will
generate an error warning the developer that information is
being leaked at that particular point in the program.
By using a begin-label on a method, we instruct Jif to check
that the program counter has the appropriate security policy
before execution starts inside the method. It also enforces that
write attempts that happen inside the method conform to the
active integrity policy.
An example of a method declaration with labels, taken from
the Jif reference manual, is shown below,
public void setElementAt{L}(Object{L} o,
int{L} i) { }
L here is a previously defined label parameter which
works similarly to generics. The begin-label of the method
setElementAt is given in braces just after the method
name.
D. Authorities
A principal may also give authority to a method to act for
it using the authority construct. An example from the Jif
reference manual is given below,
class Game authority(referee) {
void start() where authority(referee) {
// this entire method body has the
// authority of referee
...
}
}
In this snippet, the class declares that its methods can act
for a principal called referee in its signature. Then, each
one of its methods may add that it acts with the authority of
referee by adding the clause authority(referee) in
its signature. Now, each time the system queries the active
security policy in the program counter, it will do so with the
authority of the referee principle.
E. Other features
Jif supports other advanced features which we will not
cover in this report as we will not use them in the demon-
stration in section V. Notably, Jif supports polymorphism
with parametrized classes (which works similarly to generics),
dynamic labels which store label information at runtime and
extensible principals allowing developers to define their own
principal types.
IV. JIF IN ACTION
We now look at two example applications of Jif. Each
paper referenced here has been published by Jif’s creators to
promote Jif. We review their arguments for applying Jif in
two particular situations with commonly occurring real-world
equivalents.
A. Civitas: a voting system
Civitas is a voting system built using Jif [3]. The authors
state that in an election, both integrity of the whole balloting
process and confidentiality of the individual votes are neces-
sary. They say that, traditionally, each one of these can be
solved at the expense of the other. So, for example, integrity
can be achieved during an election if everyone publicly states
their own vote; this method, though, forgoes confidentiality
because everyone’s vote becomes public knowledge.
Civitas makes use of a log service shared across four
different types of voting agents. Voting agents are the entities
running and organising the election process separate from the
electorate. A log service allows data insertion signed using a
secure digital signature (prevents forging additional messages).
The bulletin board, used by the agents to tally votes, and the
individual ballot boxes, used by voters to submit their vote,
are all instances of the aforementioned log service.
Using Jif, security policies can be enforced on all the various
components of the arrangement mentioned above to ensure that
no unintended information flow occurs in the system.
In the system mentioned above, a registration teller agent
issues credentials which a voter must use when submitting
their vote. When the credentials are created in the system, the
registration teller then labels the credentials with a confiden-
tiality policy of RT → voter. This means that the owner of
the policy (the RT or registration teller principal) also allows
the voter principal to read the credentials.
Another example given by the authors is that of the integrity
policy TT ← Sup applied to ballot boxes. This label means
that the tabulation teller (TT) will consider that the ballot box’s
integrity has been compromised if someone else other than
the supervisor (Sup) or the tabulation teller themselves has
affected the value of the ballot box.
Using a modified version of Jif called JifE, the system also
declares multiple declassification and erasure policies which
state the conditions that must hold before a confidentiality
policy can be relaxed or made more restrictive. In the Civitas
system, each registration teller must store a private credential
share that will be requested by the voter as described above. By
using an erasure policy, the authors declare that the registration
teller must erase the private share component once it is handed
to the voter. In this way, we have a provably correct piece of
code which is clearly destroying the sensitive data: there is
no way that the private credential component will be leaked
to unintended entities because the erasure policy mandates its
destruction.
B. SIF: Servlet Information Flow framework
SIF is a framework built using Jif, on top of the Java Servlet
Framework, used for creating servlet-based web applications
[2]. Chong et al. discuss how web applications suffer from
multiple threats due to their nature. Specifically, web applica-
tions must frequently communicate with potentially unknown
clients. These clients are not necessarily benign and may take
advantage of vulnerabilities to retrieve sensitive data which
they are not authorised to access.
A well known information flow attack is SQL injection
where a user sends SQL commands to the web application
which are sent straight to the underlying RDBMS server
without any sanitisation. The RDBMS server will execute
the unsanitized command in full and possibly send back
information which should not have been accessible to the user.
Jif, instead, protects against more general attacks of a
similar nature. A user might know the URL of a particular
page on the web application containing sensitive data. Due to
human error, the page might have been left accessible without
the need for authentication. Using Jif, the sensitive data itself
(as opposed to the web page displaying that data) can be
labelled and Jif will ensure that such data never leaves the web
application as a response unless the authenticated principal is
correct. This is somewhat similar, albeit on a smaller scale, to
the example implementation given later in section V-A.
SIF makes heavy use of dynamic principals since web
applications usually add new users (through some sort of
registration process) during their lifecycle. Dynamic principals
are a recent addition to Jif; they allow Jif’s type checker
to reason about principals which are not yet fully known in
advance during compilation.
The authors give an example of a web application, imple-
mented in SIF, providing a calendar service for its users. Users
create events which they own and, using different security
policies, can share their events with other users and attendees.
Using Jif’s integrity policy labels, SIF allows users to express
whether they want other users to modify events or just see
events that they shared. At a lower level, the system is
checking whether the authenticated user can act for an event’s
creator or one of the attendees (using a special Jif operator,
actsfor).
By labelling the appropriate data in this way, the compiler
will statically check that an event object’s information never
reaches a user who is not the owner or one of the attendees.
A person who is reading the code finds a proof of security in
the labels that are specified with each object’s declaration.
V. A JIF EXAMPLE
In this part of the report, we present a small program written
in Jif to demonstrate how security labels can be used to restrict
unauthorised information flow. The full program listing is
found in Appendix A.
A. Defining sensitive data
For this program, we simulate a small part of a tour booking
system. A class Booking represents a booking object created
by either one of two users of the system, namely Alice and
Bob. Each booking object has a sensitive field of type String
called cardNumber which is the 16-digit credit card number
used by the customer when paying for the booking. It is
extremely important for a system of this sort that the card
number is never shown to an unauthorised user. We define the
Booking class as well as the cardNumber string as shown
in listing 1.
Listing 1. Booking class with sensitive card number.
public class Booking[principal Owner,
principal Operator] authority(Owner) {
private final String{Owner->*} cardNumber;
// ... Getter methods, etc.
}
The class is defined with respect to two principal parame-
ters, the Owner who created the booking and an Operator
user who is managing the bookings using the system.
By adding a label {Owner->*} to the cardNumber
variable, Jif will make sure that cardNumber is never
accessed by any principal which is not the the owner of
the booking. In fact, the getter function of this variable
(getFullCardNumber()) must also have its begin-label
set to {Owner->*}: the compiler will check that the program
counter has the appropriate security level before any calls to
the getter method can go through.
B. Declassifying confidential information
Information sometimes needs to flow from a highly re-
stricted and secure domain to a less restricted domain as part
of the business specifications of the system itself. In Jif, this
is realised as moving data from a variable with a particular
label to another variable with a less restrictive label.
The Jif compiler would normally not allow such an oper-
ation and will give an error. An example of this is shown in
Listing 2. Incorrect flow of information. Jif will not compile this method.
public String{Owner->Operator} getFirstSix{Owner->*}() {
try {
return cardNumber.substring(0, 6);
} catch (Exception e) {
return "N/A";
}
}
figure 1 which is an error given when attempting to compile
the method shown in listing 2. getFirstSix() is a method
which will return the first six digits of the card number used
to pay for the booking. The specifications for this program
state that an operator user can look at the first six digits of a
card number without compromising the full card number.
Jif will not compile the method because its return type’s
label is {Owner->Operator} which is less restrictive than
the card number’s label {Owner->*}. For this to work, we
must explicitly declassify the sensitive data as shown in listing
3.
The declassify keyword forces Jif to downgrade the
security policy to a less restrictive one. Notice how the
programmer must specify which policy label they want to
downgrade from as well as the policy label they are down-
grading to. This is Jif’s way of ensuring that the developer is
fully aware whenever information flow occurs from a domain
with high security to a less restrictive one.
To prevent the developer from declassifying any arbitrary
data, declassifying a policy requires the authority of the owner
of that policy. For a confidentiality policy (ie. A → B), the
owner of the policy is the principal that appears on the left
hand side. So, for the policy label that is attached to the
card number, {Owner->*}, the method getFirstSix()
requires the authority of the Owner principal as specified in
the method’s signature.
Furthermore, anyone reading a program in Jif can clearly
look for these boundaries where information is allowed to
escape (by looking for declassify keywords) and check
that the program is indeed doing what it is meant to be doing
according to some business specification.
C. Protection against unauthorised access
We now look at the main application class of our system
which performs operations on the booking class we defined
in the previous sections. This method demonstrates how Jif
protects information from inadvertently escaping its security
domain. The execute() method is given in listing 4.
The program first creates two bookings, one for Alice and
one for Bob. Chuck is the system’s operator. Each booking
takes, as principal parameters, the owner and operator users
in square brackets. We then simulate a request for data by
filling in a “notebook” for each of the users in the system.
Alice writes the full card number she used when placing
a booking in her notebook, with label {Alice->*}. Since
this is the same label used for the Alice’s card number in
her booking object, Jif allows the operation and the statement
compiles.
The commented line contains a statement where Bob tries
to copy Alice’s card number from her booking object into his
own notebook. The label on Bob’s notebook, {Bob->*} is
less restrictive than the label on Alice’s card number. In this
case, Jif would issue an error at compile time similar to the
error in figure 1. Jif stops us from making the critical mistake
of inadvertently passing Alice’s card number to Bob.
Finally, Chuck writes Alice’s first six digits from her
card number in his notebook. Now, since this is the same
information that is coming from Alice’s card number, the
label on Chuck’s notebook must be a conjunction of Chuck’s
confidentiality policy and Alice’s confidentiality policy on her
card number’s first six digits1
VI. REFLECTIONS ON JIF
Our reflection and opinions regarding Jif are based on
our experience while working on the example given in the
previous section. By using Jif, we believe that protecting
crucial sensitive data is much easier provided that the labels
are used correctly.
Jif’s labelling system suffers from the same problems ap-
parent in any other type system. Namely, the type system will
work as long as the developer uses it correctly. As a type
system, such as Jif’s, becomes more complex, the likelihood
of making an error2 becomes greater.
While working on the example presented in this report,
we encountered multiple issues with regards to selecting the
correct labels for the program to compile. Admittedly, this
is mostly due to our inexperience of working with Jif and
trial-and-error did eventually get the job done. Jif’s lack of
widespread adoption and community using the tool is also
partly to blame. A more time-constrained developer would
have taken the short-cut of simply removing any label con-
straints which were proving to be a problem until the program
compiles: the resultant system would supposedly be resilient to
incorrect information flow but in reality, none of Jif’s security
features come into play.
In spite of this, we still believe that Jif is a suitable tool
with a lot of promise. It has a good span of features which
are all documented. Jif’s creators should now focus more on
expanding the toolset available for Jif (a Jif file editor with
code suggestion is sorely needed, for instance). Also, addi-
tional documentation should be provided for troubleshooting
common problems as a new programmer using Jif will likely
encounter multiple problems when using it for the first few
times.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this report, we discussed the information flow problem,
a security concern for systems which deal with sensitive data.
We gave an overview of the Jif extension for Java which is a
1This is an ideal example of where we could have considered using an
integrity policy instead of combining confidentiality polices. We would keep
the operator’s notebook readable only by Chuck but its contents can be
affected by Alice: {Chuck → >;Chuck ← Alice}.
2“Error” here in the sense that the user does not fully specify the correct
types and takes short-cuts.
Fig. 1. Compiler error when card number is not declassified first.
Listing 3. Using declassify to relax the restrictions on the card number
variable.
public String{Owner->Operator} getFirstSix{Owner->*}() :
{Owner->Operator} where authority(Owner) {
try {
String{Owner->Operator} result = "";
result = declassify(cardNumber, {Owner->*} to
{Owner->Operator});
return result.substring(0, 6);
} catch (Exception e) {
return "N/A";
}
}
Listing 4. The execute() method in the Application class.
public void execute{Alice->Chuck meet Bob->Chuck
meet Chuck->*}()
where authority(Alice, Bob, Chuck) {
Booking[Alice, Chuck]{Alice->Chuck} booking1 =
new Booking[Alice, Chuck]("4444333322221111");
Booking[Bob, Chuck]{Bob->Chuck} booking2 =
new Booking[Bob, Chuck]("4444333322221111");
String{Alice->*} aliceNotebook =
booking1.getFullCardNumber();
// The compiler would issue an error for the next line
// String{Bob->*} bobNotebook =
// booking1.getFullCardNumber();
String{Chuck->*;Alice->Chuck} operatorNotebook
= booking1.getFirstSix();
}
tool to help alleviate this security concern. We listed its main
features and how they are expressed in Java code.
Civitas and SIF were given as examples of systems built
using Jif where we see the information flow problem clearly.
Civitas, for example, has multiple entities which have to
cooperate together but are mutually distrusting of each other.
Jif therefore enforces security constraints on the data which
the aforementioned entities have to work with. Likewise, SIF
implements security constraints for web applications which
are repeatedly targeted in information flow attacks where an
adversary attempts to extract unauthorised information which
they normally should not have access to.
Finally, we developed a small example using Jif where we
protected sensitive data from accidentally leaking outside its
security domain. Using the program we also gave constructive
criticism for Jif as a whole. In essence, we have come to the
conclusion that Jif is indeed a suitable tool for solving the
information flow problem.
REFERENCES
[1] Stephen Chong, Andrew C. Myers, K. Vikram, and Lantian Zheng.
JIF Reference Manual. http://www.cs.cornell.edu/jif/doc/jif-3.3.0/manual.
html, February 2009.
[2] Stephen Chong, K. Vikram, and Andrew C. Myers. SIF: Enforcing
confidentiality and integrity in web applications. In Proceedings of the
16th USENIX Security Symposium, SS’07, pages 1:1–1:16, Berkeley, CA,
USA, 2007. USENIX Association.
[3] M.R. Clarkson, Stephen Chong, and Andrew C. Myers. Civitas: Toward
a secure voting system. In Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, 2008. SP 2008, pages 354–368, May 2008.
[4] Willem De Groef, Dominique Devriese, Nick Nikiforakis, and Frank
Piessens. Secure multi-execution of web scripts: Theory and practice.
Journal of Computer Security, 22(4):469–509, April 2014.
[5] Dorothy E. Denning. A lattice model of secure information flow.
Commun. ACM, 19(5):236–243, May 1976.
[6] Dorothy E. Denning and Peter J. Denning. Certification of programs for
secure information flow. Commun. ACM, 20(7):504–513, July 1977.
[7] D. Hedin and A. Sabelfeld. Information-flow security for a core of
JavaScript. In Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), 2012
IEEE 25th, pages 3–18, June 2012.
[8] A. Sabelfeld and A.C. Myers. Language-based information-flow security.
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 21(1):5–19, January
2003.
APPENDIX
A. Booking.jif
package edu.ac.ed.apl.s1461410.jifdemo;
public class Booking[principal Owner,
principal Operator] authority(Owner) {
private final String{Owner->*} cardNumber;
public Booking(String{Owner->*} number) {
this.cardNumber = number;
}
public String{Owner->*} getFullCardNumber{Owner->*}() {
return cardNumber;
}
public String{Owner->Operator} getFirstSix{Owner->*}()
: {Owner->Operator} where authority(Owner) {
try {
String{Owner->Operator} result = "";
result = declassify(cardNumber,
{Owner->*} to {Owner->Operator});
return result.substring(0, 6);
} catch (Exception e) {
return "N/A";
}
}
public String{Owner->Operator} getLastFour{Owner->*}()
: {Owner->Operator} where authority(Owner) {
try {
String{Owner->Operator} result = "";
result = declassify(cardNumber,
{Owner->*} to {Owner->Operator});
return result.substring(12, 16);
} catch (Exception e) {
return "N/A";
}
}
public String{Owner->Operator} getHashedNumber{Owner->*}()
: {Owner->Operator} {
return getFirstSix() + "******" + getLastFour();
}
}
B. Application.jif
package edu.ac.ed.apl.s1461410.jifdemo;
public class Application authority(Alice, Bob, Chuck) {
public void execute{Alice->Chuck meet Bob->Chuck meet Chuck->*}()
where authority(Alice, Bob, Chuck) {
Booking[Alice, Chuck]{Alice->Chuck} booking1 =
new Booking[Alice, Chuck]
("4444333322221111");
Booking[Bob, Chuck]{Bob->Chuck} booking2 =
new Booking[Bob, Chuck](
"4444333322221111");
String{Alice->*} aliceNotebook =
booking1.getFullCardNumber();
// The compiler would issue an error for the line below
// String{Bob->*} bobNotebook =
// booking1.getFullCardNumber();
String{Chuck->*;Alice->Chuck} operatorNotebook =
booking1.getFirstSix();
}
public static void main{Alice->Chuck meet Bob->Chuck meet Chuck->*}
(String[] args) {
new Application().execute();
}
}
